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CONDITIONS

EMPLOYEE'S JOB STATUS ON FAVORABLE RESPONSE-Tomkins

v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977).
Adrienne Tomkins was initially hired as an office worker by Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (PSE&G) in April of 1971.1 For more
than two years she advanced to positions bearing additional responsibilities. 2 In August 1973, she began working in a secretarial posi3
tion under the direction of a male supervisor.
Two months later, Tomkins' supervisor invited her to lunch "in
order to discuss his upcoming evaluation of her work, as well as a
possible job promotion."

4

While at the restaurant, advances were

made toward her by the supervisor who suggested that sexual intimacy would be required in order "to have a satisfactory working relationship." 5 Attempting to end this discussion by leaving the restaurant, Tomkins was subjected to threats of reprisal against her as
an employee. 6 When these proved ineffective, the supervisor then
threatened her with bodily abuse and finally resorted to actual physical restraint. 7 Additionally, she was warned that PSE&G personnel
would not be sympathetic should she complain about this particular
episode."
The following day, Tompkins conveyed to PSE&G her desire to
leave its employ as a result of the previous day's events. 9 The company induced her to stay by offering her "a transfer to a comparable
' Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
2 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
' Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977). The
supervisor was a named defendant when Tomkins initially brought suit. The district court, however, granted his motion to dismiss any claims against him due to lack of pendent jurisdiction.
422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
" Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
5 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
6 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
7 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
s Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
9 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d Cir. 1977). In the
interim, Tomkins contacted a New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Claims Office and was informed of her eligibility for benefits in the event she quit her position at PSE&G. Plaintiff-Appellant's Appeal Brief at 6, Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
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position." 10 Rather than remain with her supervisor and wait for
such a "comparable position" to open up, Tomkins accepted placement in a lesser position. 1 Following this transfer "she was subjected to false and adverse employment evaluations, disciplinary layoffs, and threats of demotion by various PSE&G employees."12 In
January 1975, as a result of an "extremely poor attendance record," 13
4
Tomkins was fired.'
Subsequently, Tomkins filed suit 15 in federal district court "alleg[ing] that PSE&G and certain of its agents knew or should have
known" that events such as those which had transpired would in fact
occur and that, in spite of such knowledge, took no action to avert
such conduct by its employees. 16 PSE&G moved to dismiss the action on several grounds 17 "including failure to state a claim upon
10

Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d Cir. 1977).
11 Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 7; Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568
F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d Cir. 1977).
12 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d Cir. 1977). Because of
the luncheon incident and her treatment by PSE&G and various personnel following her protest
and transfer, Tomkins maintained she suffered both physically and emotionally, "resulting in
absenteeism and loss of income." Id.
13 Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 3, Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044 (3d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellee]. Tomkins was employed at PSE&G
for a period of three years and nine months. During that time, she was absent 130 days and
suspended 15 days due to chronic absenteeism. Id.
14 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). PSE&G contended that Tomkins' absenteeism
was the "sole reason" for her dismissal. Brief of Appellee, supra note 13, at 3.
15 Following her termination, Tomkins filed an employment discrimination charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Upon investigation of the complaint, the EEOC
dismissed the charge and notified Tomkins of her right to sue. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co., 422 F. Stipp. 553, 555 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part that "[i]f a charge filed
with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the Commission, . . . the Commission . . . shall so

notify the person aggrieved and . . . a civil action may be brought against the respondent
named in the charge ....
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
For a more complete discussion of the powers and procedures of the EEOC, see generally
Comment, The Permissible Scope of Title VII Actions, 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 493 (1977).
'" Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd and
remanded, 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977). Specifically, Tomkins alleged that PSE&G's
actions and omissions constituted a violation of Title VII "by discriminating . . . in her terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment on the basis of her sex." Amended Complaint at 8,
39, Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd and
remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
'7 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). Among other defenses, PSE&G essentially averred that the supervisor's actions "were outside the scope of his employment;" "were not ratified
by" PSE&G; and "were not and could not have been anticipated ....
Additionally, PSE&G
contended that neither its acts nor the acts of its agents constituted employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII. Answer to Amended Complaint of Defendant, Public Service Electric
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which relief may be granted." 8 With respect to Tomkins' allegation
of sexual harassment, the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey granted the company's motion based on its interpretation of Title VII as precluding a cause of action against an employer
for the "personal" activities of its supervisors. 19
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 2 0 reversed the
district court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 2 ' Judge Aldisert, speaking for the court, interpreted the applicable provision of Title VII as requiring "both that
the acts complained of constitut[e] a condition of employment, and
that this condition [is] imposed by the employer on the basis of
sex." 22 Accordingly, the appellate court found that the dismissal of
the claim overlooked the fundamental "thrust[s] of Tomkins' complaint," that PSE&G, "either knowingly or constructively," imposed

and Gas Company at 6, 7, Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J.
1976), rev'd and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
18Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). As stated by the court, the issues were
whether sexual harassment of a female employee by a male supervisor constitutes
sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII; and whether the conduct of an
employer after a complaint of such harassment can amount to sex discrimination
within the meaning of Title VII.
422 F. Supp. at 556. The district court bifurcated the two issues, denying PSE&G's motion to
dismiss on the question of company retaliation following Tomkins' grievance. Id. at 557. According to the court, a violation of Title VII may exist when an employer elects to ignore a
complaint of sexual harassment, opting instead to fire the female victim of the abuse. The court
reasoned that such a decision may evidence a preference for male employment rather than
female employment. Id.
19 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556-57 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). Sexual harassment in employment engaged in by
supervisory personnel was conceded to be an "abuse of authority" and "an unhappy and recurrent feature of our social experience." In the court's view, however, such factual reality was not
sufficient for purposes of defining it as sex discrimination within the scope of Title VII. 422 F.
Supp. at 556. For further discussion of the court's rationale, see notes 109-12 infra and accompanying text.
20 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
21 Id. at 1045, 1049. A consent order was subsequently handed down by the New Jersey
district court on July 6, 1978 wherein PSE&G acknowledged "sexual advances or sexual harassment" as violative of Title VII when a term or condition of employment is imposed. Consent
Order No. 75-1673 at 1, Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977). Such recognition required the implementation of an official policy, including dissemination of information to all employees regarding such policy, investigation of complaints and establishment of grievance procedures, designed to "fully comply" with its responsibilities under
the Act. Id. at 2-4. Additionally, Adrienne Tomkins was awarded $20,000. Id. at 4.
22 568 F.2d at 1046, 1048. Tomkins had specifically alleged both elements. See note 16
supra.
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upon her an additional condition of employment 23 and that this additional condition was imposed because of gender. 2 4 Applying the
necessary requirements to Tomkins' complaint, the court concluded
that a cause of action within the permissible scope of Title VII had
been sufficiently pleaded. 2 5 Thus, aligning itself with both the
Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 26 and the
Fourth Circuit,2 7 the Third Circuit has held, for the first time, that
sexual harassment constitutes a valid cause of action under Title VII.
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII of
that Act has proscribed sex discrimination in employment. 2 Unfortunately, however, the permissible scope of this prohibition has been
difficult to gauge given the sparse legislative history underlying the
inclusion of the word "sex" into the final bill. 29 In 1972, when the Act
23 Id. at 1046-47. Unlike the lower court, this court did not view the supervisor's actions as
purely personal but as realistically infringing upon Tomkins' employment situation. His express
proposition, as well as the context within which it occurred, clearly evidenced the foretelling of
adverse employment consequences. Id.
24 Id. at 1047. It should be noted that this case was before the court on appeal from a
motion to dismiss. Thus, the court was satisfied that a requisite element of the Title VII violation and "the essence of ... [Tomkins'] claim"-discrimination based on sex-was clearly alleged in the complaint. Id.
25 Id. at 1048-49. Specifically, the court held
that Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate
employee and conditions that employee's job status-evaluation, continued
employment, promotion, or other aspects of career development-on a favorable
response to those advances or demands, and the employer does not take prompt
and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such knowledge.
Id.
26 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see notes 85-95 infra and accompanying
text.
27 Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); see notes 96-98
infra and accompanying text.
' Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). The applicable provision for

purposes of this note states in pertinent part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
29 On February 8, 1964, an amendment was proposed in the House of Representatives by
Congressman Smith (D. Va.) to insert the word "sex" into the final bill. 110 CONG. REc. 2577
(1964). It is generally believed that this proposal was an attempt by one opponent of the bill to
deliberately effect its demise. See Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454,
462 n.4 (D.N.J. 170), aff'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 477 F.2d 90 (3d
Cir. 1973); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 987.
The limited debate on the proposal implied that Title VII as so amended would have little
chance of successful passage. 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964). The opponents' tactical maneuver

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:108

was amended to provide the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with enforcement powers, 30 sex discrimination in
employment was acknowledged by the House Education and Labor
31
Committee as one area warranting particular congressional action.
Thus, lacking specificity both from the language of the Act itself and
from its legislative history, the proper scope of sex discrimination is
gleaned primarily from judicial opinions interpreting the whole of
3 2
Title VII's employment discrimination proviso.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the language of the statute clearly evinces a congressional purpose "to assure
equality of employment opportunities" without regard to "race, color,
religion, sex or national origin." 33 Moreover, in affording equitable
relief, the courts see as their duty both the elimination of "the discriminatory effects of the past" and, concomitantly, the prevention of
comparable "discrimination in the future." '3 4 Since the policy to
eradicate discrimination was considered by Congress "to be of the
'highest priority,' "'5 the courts have enunciated and effected a lib36
eral construction of the act.
The Supreme Court has also emphasized that Title VII is no less
available to vindicate an individual, as opposed to a class, right to
non-discriminatory employment. 3 7 Further, there is a presumption
failed, however, and the amendment was adopted with minimal substantive discussion by a vote
of 168 to 133. 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964).

30Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975)) (amending Title VII)."
31 H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2140-41. Although eight years had passed since the enactment of Title VII, current statistics evidenced a need to provide additional impetus in order to alleviate the continuing problem of sex discrimination in employment. Id. at 2140.
32 The EEOC also issues guidelines interpreting Title VII and, while not binding on the
courts, these guidelines are frequently "entitled to great deference." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976)
("courts properly may accord less weight to such guidelines").
33 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971)).
"' Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
35 415 U.S. at 47 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968)).
36 See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535, 538 n.3 (5th Cir.
1973) ("a broad interpretation of discrimination was intended"); Henderson v. Eastern Freight
Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 912 (1973) ("Act .. . is
remedial in character and should be generously construed to achieve its purposes"). But see
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
11 See generally 415 U.S. at 45-51. The Court in Alexander reasons that Title VII, in providing for a private right of action in addition to empowering the EEOC to bring its own suits,
allows "the private litigant not only [to] redres[s] his own injury but also [to] vindicat[e] the
important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 45. Essentially, the Court is propounding a private attorney general theory under Title VII.
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underlying Title VII analysis that no relative distinctions exist between the protected classes, that is, Title VII accords no priorities to
38
any one class over another.
With respect to sex discrimination specifically, it was recognized
by the Seventh Circuit, in the seminal decision of Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 39 that Congress did not intend to limit the scope of
section 703(a) of Title VII to discriminatory conduct "based 'solely' on
sex." 40 The Act prohibits discriminatory employment practices based
on cultural stereotypes or physical attributes even if such practices
41
affect only a portion of the protected class.
Initially, Title VII wis applied to invalidate blatant discriminatory policies and practices affecting the protected class. 4 2 It soon
became obvious, however, that certain discriminatory conduct was
much more subtle though clearly contrary to the stated purpose of

38 See, e.g., Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1969)
("discrimination on account of sex is ...

[not] less reprehensible . . . [nor] less protected than

discrimination because of race").
This presumption legitimately reflects a congressional purpose of the Act in view of committee discussions prior to amending Title VII where it was stated that "[d]iscrimination against
women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be
accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination." H.R.
REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2141.
The great bulk of Title VII case law exists in the area of racial discrimination. Utilizing the
above presumption allows foundational bases, tests and principles, developed to eradicate racial
employment discrimination, to be applied without reservation in a sex discrimination context as
well. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). This is particularly important
for analytical purposes when a court initially propounds a new cause of action under Title VII,
as is the case in Tomkins, for then rational analogies may be made in order to define the
parameters of a newly prohibited discriminatory act.
39 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
40 444 F.2d at 1198. United Air Lines, employment policy required that their stewardesses
be unmarried, but a similar policy was not imposed on any male employees including stewards.
Id. at 1196. The court, in holding this policy violative of Title VII, cited with approval EEOC
guidelines construing sex discrimination to exist "so long as sex is a factor in the application of
the rule." Id. at 1198; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (1977).
Sprogis' analysis is a reasonable reading of congressional intent, see 110 CONG. REC.
13837-38 (1964), and rejects what has come to be labeled "sex-plus" discrimination wherein
classifications are established on the basis of sex plus an additional factor, e.g., marriage. For a
more comprehensive discussion of "sex-plus" discrimination, see generally Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1171-72 (1971); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices of Private
Employers: Recent Legal Developments, 48 TUL. L. REv. 125, 141-44 (1973).
41 444 F.2d at 1198 (footnote omitted).
42 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977) (referring to congressional discussion of Act, Court noted that "[u]ndoubtedly disparate
treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII") (emphasis added).
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the Act. 43 Faced with this reality, the United States Supreme Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.44 ruled that "[u]nder the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 45 While Griggs
involved racial discrimination, the Supreme Court subsequently recognized the viability of the "disproportionate impact" test in a sex
46
discrimination context.
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,4 7 the Court considered
whether an employer's disability plan excluding "disabilities arising
from pregnancy" constituted sex discrimination as proscribed by Title
VII.48 While the Court held that the plan did not discriminate on
the basis of sex, 49 it affirmed the disproportionate impact rationale,
implying its applicability in instances of sex discrimination. 50 Subsequently, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,5 1 the Court determined that an
Alabama statute establishing "facially neutral" minimum height and
weight requirements for the position of prison guard was prima facie
sex discrimination. 52 According to the Court, national statistics produced at trial sufficiently presented a case of discriminatory impact-a majority of women were effectively made ineligible for the
position. 5 3 Since discriminatory intent need not be shown to prove a
Title VII disproportionate impact violation, 54 statistical evidence de"' McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("Title VII tolerates no
racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise") (emphasis added).
44 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
45 Id. at 430 (emphasis added). Since Griggs, unless an employer can show "business necessity," a facially neutral employment practice which disproportionately affects one class over
another is prima facie discriminatory despite a non-discriminatory intent. Id. at 430-32.
41 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1976); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
47 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
48 Id.

at 127-28.

49 Id. at 128, 145-46. The Court analogized to a prior decision decided under equal protection analysis involving a similar disability plan. Id. at 133-40. The Court reasoned that the
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from the plan does not disproportionately affect
women because under the terms of the plan both men and women possess equal coverage. Id.
at 138-39.
50 Id. at 136-37. The test was inapplicable
in Gilbert because the respondents had not
met
their burden of proving "gender-based" effect. Id. at 137. "Absent a showing of ... [such]
gender-based effect, there can be no violation of § 703(a)(1)." Id. at 137 n.15.
51 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
52 Id. at 331.
53 Id. at 329-31. The minimum 5' 2", 120 lb. standards required by Alabama statute to
qualify for the position were found to "exclude 41.13% of the female population" and "between
2.35% and 3.63%" of the male population. Id. at 329-30 & n.12.
54 401 U.S. at 430, 432. But cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977). The Court in Teamsters distinguishes between "disparate impact" and "disparate
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noting a disproportionate impact 55 coupled with the courts' conception of the particular purposes and policies to be furthered by the Act
were relevant factors in developing a certain sophistication necessary
to deal with the subtler forms of employment discrimination.
Sexual harassment in the work environment 56 was not initially
accepted as discrimination within the purview of Title VII. 5 7 The
courts had difficulty in conceptualizing sexual harassment as actionable-either as sex discrimination per se, 5 8 or as an additional term
or condition of employment. 59 In Barnes v. Train, 60 a woman
employee of the federal government filed a complaint alleging that
her refusal to engage in sexual relations resulted in the abolition of
her former position and subsequent reassignment to a substantially
inferior one. 61 The issue before the court was whether the alleged
retaliatory actions of the plaintiff's supervisor constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. 6 2 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia concluded that no claim had been stated
since the alleged retaliation was in response to the plaintiff's refusal
to engage in sexual relations with her supervisor, not because she was
a woman. 63 Therefore, no gender-based discrimination as required
treatment." Id. at 335-36 n. 15. While affirming the irrelevancy of intent in a disproportionate
impact context, the Court made it clear that "discriminatory motive is critical" in cases alleging
disparate treatment. Id.
55 See, e.g., 433 U.S. at 330-31.
56 "Sexual harassment at the workplace" has been defined to "include verbal harassment or
abuse, subtle pressure for sexual activity, as well as rape and attempted rape." ALLIANCE
AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT THE WORKPLACE 1 (1977).
51 See notes 60-77, 105-113 infra and accompanying text. The underlying rationale for the
courts' original position seems to reflect a genuine lack of awareness of the enervating employment effects burdening the victim as a result of sexual harassment. The opinions all expressly or
impliedly fear "a federal challenge based on alleged sex motivated considerations ... in every
case of a lost promotion, transfer, demotion or dismissal." Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F.
Supp. 233, 236 (N. D. Cal. 1976). Thus, it was considerably less difficult to view the conduct as
primarily "personal" in nature. See, e.g., Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123, 124
(D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"' See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123
(D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and remanded sub nor. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
" See Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Corne v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
60 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
61 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 985 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
82 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 124. In Train, as in all the cases considering sexual harassment, the issue arose in the context of the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The courts, therefore, were evaluating plaintiffs' complaints and a procedural evolutionary pattern can be seen. Allegations in subsequent complaints incorporated substantive matter
from prior decisions. Eventually, the courts were bound to recognize a stated cause of action.
63

Id.
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by the Act was shown. 6 4 Additionally, the court viewed the situation
as "a controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious
personal relationship" and thus not evidential of a gender-based, arbi65
trary barrier to continued employment.
In Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 66 the plaintiffs contended
they were women, "that they were repeatedly subjected to verbal
and physical sexual" abuses by their supervisor, and as a result, were
forced to resign. 67 The Arizona district court found no cause of action under Title VII concluding that " 'verbal and physical sexual advances' " could not reasonably be construed as falling within the
scope of the Act. 6 8 In interpreting prior Title VII sex discrimination
cases, the court found it significant that the conduct in this instance
did not arise out of a company policy whereby benefits to the company would inure. 6 9 Though occurring within a supervisory/subordinate context, such actions were not related to the natural employ70
ment relationship.
Although distinguishable on its facts, the alleged sexual harassment in Miller v. Bank of America 71 was similarly outside the reach
of Title VII protection. 7 2 The plaintiff therein asserted that her
supervisor promised her a better position conditioned upon her being
"sexually 'cooperative.' "73 When she refused, her employment was
terminated. 74 It was undisputed that the Bank's company-wide pol64 Id. While conceding that Title VII discrimination has generally been broadly construed,
the court nevertheless was of the view that sexual harassment could not be understood to fall
within the intended scope of the Act. Id.
63 Id.
66 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975).
67 Id.

at 162.

Id. at 163. The court reasoned that sexual harassment was not sex discrimination. If males
were sexually harassed, there would be no discriminatory basis for a suit tinder the Act. Id.
68
69

Id.

The court very narrowly construed "employer" in rejecting the plaintiffs' claim. It

viewed the supervisor's conduct as "nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or
mannerism." Id. Thus, based on the Corne decision, sexual harassment is not employment
discrimination within the scope of Title VII absent a specific employer policy condoning such

conduct. Id.
70

Id.

It appears from the obvious omission of any reference to an agency relationship that

the court was unwilling to impute liability to the employer for this type of conduct by its
supervisory personnel.
71 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The plaintiff had pursued relief tinder the provisions
of Title VII without first making known her grievance to the employer. Id. at 234.
72 Id. at 236. In exculpating the employer from liability, the Miller court expressly relied

upon the failure of the plaintiff to utilize the employer's internal grievance procedure. Id. at 236
n.2. Underlying determinative considerations of the type expressed or implied in the Train and
Corne decisions, however, may be abstracted from a fair reading of the opinion.
73 Id.

at 234.
74 Id. The court viewed the issue to be whether Title VII was meant to impose liability

upon an employer for what was in essence "the isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct of one
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icy expressly discouraged such employee misconduct and provided
relief through a grievance and remedial procedure. 7 5 Since the
plaintiff failed to avail herself of these internal processes, the court
concluded it would be unreasonable to find the employer culpable in
such a situation. 7 6 Significantly, the court emphasized the importance of specific factual allegations for purposes of finding employer
liability, conceding that an employer's active or constructive approval
of a policy imposing sexual favors as a condition of employment might
be actionable sex discrimination under Title VII. 77
In April 1976, four months prior to the Miller decision, the District Court for the District of Columbia held in Williams v. Saxbe 78
that the "retaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken because a
female employee declined his sexual advances, constitutes sex discrimination within the definitional parameters of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."79 The court analogized the "willingness to proemployee to another." Id. (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court has since
stated that "[tihere is no exception in the terms of the Act for isolated cases." McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 n.8 (1976) (emphasis added).
The court here is fundamentally grappling with the concept of employer liability for the
acts of its employees within the employment environment. Acceptance of the principle of respondent superior within the context of sexual harassment is a most important factor for ultimately finding a Title VII violation. Once agency was recognized conceptually, Title VII provided a remedy. For further discussion, see notes 84, 94, 103-04, 108, 112, 120 infra and
accompanying text.
" 418 F. Supp. at 234. Affidavits offered by management alleged that it was the Bank's
policy "to prevent and prohibit moral misconduct . . and to suspend and/or dismiss and/or
reprimand .. .employees who have made sexual advances to their co-employees, subordinate
employees or superior employees." Id. at 235.
76 Id. at 236 n.2.
" Id. at 236. The court's concession was in light of a District of Columbia district court case
decided prior to Miller. See notes 78-84 infra and accompanying text. Such deference, however, was immediately qualified by an approving citation to Come and the court's own express
apprehensions regarding the potential abuse if employer liability were to be imposed. 418 F.
Supp. at 236.
" 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
79 Id. at 657. The plaintiff alleged the working relationship with her supervisor was normal
until she declined his sexual advances. Id. at 655. Thereafter, she was subjected to "a continuing pattern and practice of harassment and humiliation" resulting in eventual termination. id.
The core of the defendant's argument was that, even assuming a sexual stereotype precipitated the supervisor's conduct, the class to be protected cannot be defined in terms of the
particular stereotype, but rather must be described by a variable which distinguishes its members from those outside the class, i.e., gender. Here, the "primary variable" which distinguished the class was "willingness vel non to furnish sexual consideration," applicable to both
men and women. Id. at 657. Hence, both genders were similarly situated. Since Title VII
requires sex discrimination to be gender-based, the conduct complained of was not within the
definitional scope of the Act. Id.
This argument was based on the rationale advanced in Train. In rejecting it, the Williams
court was essentially overruling its own Title VII analysis, declining to adhere to so confining a
view of the prohibitional scope of the Act. See notes 60-65 supra and accompanying text.
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vide sexual consideration" requirement to the "sex-plus" requirements 8 0 of Sprogis and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.8
The
rationale of those cases-that a Title VII violation does not occur only
when an employment practice or policy turns upon a characteristic
peculiar to one of the genders, i.e., "solely" on sex -was adopted by
Williams.8 2 In the court's view, the supervisor's conduct "created an
artificial barrier to employment" effectively burdening one gender
and not the other, though theoretically "both . . .were similarly
situated."-83 The court also determined that if, as alleged, it was the
supervisor's practice to impose on female employees a condition of
sexual submission, then it was imputedly the practice of his
84
employer.
Barnes v. Costle, 85 reversing the summary judgment awarded in
Barnes v. Train, 8 6 represented the District of Columbia Circuit's attempt, in light of Williams v. Saxbe, to further erode the reasoning of
Train.8 7 The appellate court found that the conduct at issue was
clearly based on gender since the imposed condition-sexual submission in return for job retention-would never have been required
413 F. Supp. at 658-59; see note 40 supra.
81 400 U.S. 542 (1971). In Phillips, the employer refused to hire any woman with pre-school
age children whereas fathers with children of similar age were not disqualified from employment. Id. at 543.
82 413 F. Supp. at 659. It was the court's view that a literal interpretation of" 'sex discrimination' " within the meaning of the statute includes all discrimination based on gender, noting
that Title VII applies to both men and women. Id. at 658.
83 Id. at 657-58, 659. Under the Williams holding, it is the retaliatory actions following
rejection of the suggested sexual activity and not the sexual harassment per se which constitutes
a violation of Title VII. Id. at 657-61.
Though the Williams court disclaimed the theory that a finding of discrimination was dependent upon the supervisor's sexual preference, it expressed the view that a finding of discrimination would be precluded were the supervisor bisexual. Yet, a cause of action would exist
where the supervisor imposing a sexual condition was homosexual or female heterosexual. Id. at
659 n.6. For further discussion, see notes 139-42 infra and accompanying text.
84 Id. at 660. This is a very broad interpretation of agency principles. The rationale,
however, indicates an unwillingness to defeat the plaintiff's claim at the pleading stage, for as the court
points out, whether the conduct represents an employment policy or is purely personal in
nature "requires a factual determination" at trial. Id.
85 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
86 Id. at 984, 995. The sole issue on appeal was whether the discrimination alleged-abolition of appellant's position-was gender-based. Id. at 988-89. It was additionally alleged that
prior to the ultimate elimination of the position, the supervisor and other agents of the
80

employer joined in an intentional effort " 'to belittle . . . harass . . . and . . . strip . . . [appel-

lant] of her job duties.' " Id. at 985.
87 Id. at 989-94. The court rejected the analysis of the lower court which had proposed that
the employment retaliation was not gender-based but had occurred because of a refusal to
engage in sexual activity. See text accompanying note 63 supra. The appellate court maintained
that such a view ignores the fact that the reason sexual activity was suggested at all was precisely because the employee was a woman. Id. at 990.
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had the employee been male. 88 Thus, the supervisor's particular
demand was "immaterial" to a finding of sex discrimination.8 9 The
decision was grounded upon the fact that some term of employment,
not reasonably related to job performance, was required of one gender and not the other.9 0 Since gender was such a substantial factor
in the discriminatory scheme, a prima facie case of sex discrimination
within the scope of Title VII had been advanced. 9 1
Uncertain of its meaning, yet aware of its implications, the appellate court felt compelled to confront the "inharmonious personal
relationship" language used by the district court, 92 alluding to two
possible interpretations and disposing of each. 93 First, the court determined that the supervisor's conduct could not be regarded as
purely personal for purposes of evading Title VII's proscriptions,
since generally an employer is responsible under the Act for the
"discriminatory practices of [its] supervisory personnel." 9 4 Alterna88Id. at 989-90. In so finding, the court relied on a "but for" analysis-"[b]ut for her
womanhood," she would not have been approached nor required to acquiesce in sexual activity
in order to retain her position. Id. at 990.
89 Id. at 989 n.49. This conclusion is substantially in accord with the Williams rationale. See
note 83 supra. It is not the request for sexual activity itself that establishes sex discrimination
under the Act, but that such a request with attendant employment ramifications was initiated
because the employee was female. Id.
90 Id. at 989-90 & n.49.
91 Id. at 990. In recognizing that discrimination under these circumstances was not based
solely on sex, this court rejected, as did the district court in Williams, the "sex-plus" rationale.
See note 40 supra. Essentially, the court found that gender plus cooperation were indispensible
elements of job-retention whereas male employees were not faced with similar impositions for
their continued employment. 561 F.2d at 992.
92 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 124; see text at note 65 supra.
93 561 F.2d at 992-94. The two possible underlying purposes for the statement, according to
the appellate court's interpretation, were either a rejection of the applicability of agency principles or a preclusion of a discrimination finding because only one employee was affected. Id. at
992-93.
9' Id. at 993. The court deferred to the Miller decision, but found the facts of Costle to be
significantly distinguishable. There was no showing that the employer was without knowledge of
the conduct of its agents or that the situation would have been corrected once notice was given.
Id. & n.72.
While the majority's reference to employer liability was limited to this brief holding, the
basis of the concurring opinion was an in-depth comparative analysis of common law and statutory principles of vicarious liability. Id. at 995-1001 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). The ultimate
result of judge MacKinnon's analysis was to narrowly define the permissible boundaries of
employer liability in sexual harassment circumstances. Id. at 1001. Concluding that the
employer could not be found liable under general principles of agency and tort law, id. at 996,
the statutory language and intent of Title VII was examined and analogized to prior interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 997-1001. The opinion reasons that only one
statutory rationale for imposing employer liability is applicable-the employer is in the best
position to know of the employment harm after having been apprised of the situation. Id. at
999-1000. It is also fundamental under this reasoning that other agents of the employer, in
addition to the supervisor, participated in conduct detrimental to the complaining employee. Id.
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tively, the conduct could not be regarded as non-discriminatory because only one employee was affected as Title VII protects the indi95
vidual as well as the entire class.
In Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., 96 the Fourth Circuit
reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of a complaint
97
which had alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
Broadly interpreting the complaint, the court held that allegations of
"employer policy or acquiescence in a practice ... compelling female
employees to submit to the sexual advances of their male supervisors"
sufficiently stated a cause of action. 98
In Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 99 it was held that a cause
of action under Title VII was stated when a female employee was
terminated in retaliation for spurning the sexual advances of her
supervisor. 10 0 The court considered the pivotal issues to be: first,
whether sexual harassment was sex discrimination within the purview

at 1000. Under the facts, therefore, employer liability may be imposed if it can be shown "that
other management personnel harassed petitioner, . . . that her supervisors retaliated against her
for . . . [filing a complaint] and that her employer, with knowledge of the facts alleged by her,
ratified the discrimination that her supervisor had improperly imposed upon her." Id. at 1001
(emphasis added).
While the concurrence was an attempt to qualify what was perceived to be the majority's
broad statement of liability, it appears that both opinions, though premised on opposite principles, effect substantially similar results. The only discernible distinction substantively seems to
be the concurrence's requirement that other agents must participate in the discriminatory conduct. Such a requirement may not be entirely reasonable; the possibility exists that one supervisor, acting alone, can, by virtue of his position in the management hierarchy, cause similar
employment harm.
The crucial differentiation between the two opinions is essentially procedural. The majority
assumes the employer is liable for the acts of its agents unless it shows that it was without
knowledge of acts in contravention of employer policy and it would have rectified the harm
incurred once it attained knowledge of the facts. Id. at 993. The concurrence assumes an
employer is not liable for the acts of its agents unless it is shown that the employer, with
knowledge of the retaliatory conduct, ratified the acts of its agents. Id. at 1001. Thus, tinder the
majority's presumption, the plaintiff would only have the burden of introducing the evidence
while the burden of persuasion falls on the defendant-employer. Under the concurrence's presumption, however, the burdens of introduction and of persuasion are borne by the plaintiffemployee.
95 Id. at 99.3-94; see note 37 supra and accompanying text.
96 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
97 Id. at 1032.
98 Id.
99 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
100 Id. at 466. The claimed sexual harassment consisted of "overt" demands of sexual intimacy
and "repeated sexual suggestions and innuendoes." Id. at 460. Additionally, it was alleged that
the supervisor threatened to fire the plaintiff for noncompliance with his demands. Id. When he
ultimately carried out his threat, a protest was presented to his immediate supervisor who
ratified the termination. Id. A subsequent meeting with these parties plus the company's owner
and representing attorneys failed to culminate in a settlement. Id.
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of Title VII; and second, whether an "employment practice" was in1 1
volved so as to impose employer liability.
As to the first issue, this court expressly agreed with both the
Costle and Williams sex discrimination analyses, rejecting any suggestion that discrimination under the Act was "limited to sexual
stereotyping." 102 Turning to the second issue, the court was of the
view that a failure to follow through on employee discrimination
grievances may be sufficient to impute liability to the employer for
the discriminatory conduct of its agents.1 03 Thus, "an employer has
an affirmative duty to investigate complaints of sexual harassment and
deal appropriately with the offending personnel." 104
When the New Jersey district court in Tomkins v. Public Service
Electric & Gas C0.10 5 first considered the issue of sexual harassment
under Title VII analysis, Williams v. Saxbe was the sole decision
favoring such a cause of action under the Act. 10 6 The lower court
rejected the Williams conclusion, aligned itself with those cases adjudging otherwise, 10 7 and held "that sexual harassment and sexually
motivated assault do not constitute sex discrimination under Title
VII." 108

The primary basis for so concluding appeared to rest on the view
that gender-based discrimination under these circumstances was to101 Id. at 465. The court considered these issues to be separate yet "interrelated" aspects of a
valid cause of action as determined by prior interpretation of sexual harassment under Title VII
analysis. Id.
102 Id.
at 465-66; see notes 80-83, 88-91 supra and accompanying text. The court also

deemed the legislative intent of the Act and EEOC regulations as pertinent support for its conclusion. 441 F. Supp. at 465-66.
" 441 F. Supp. at 466. The court preliminarily determined that the defendant company was plainly
within the statutory definition of "employer." Id. The two supervisors, because of their personnel decision-making responsibilities, were deemed agents of such employer. Id.
104 Id. (emphasis added). The court interpreted Costle as imposing automatic vicarious liability upon an employer and specifically declined to follow suit. Id. Under Munford, therefore, the
burden is upon the plaintiff-employee to prove a discriminatory scheme by the defendantemployer. Id. This view is in substantial agreement with the Costle concurrence. See note 94
supra.
105 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
106 See notes 78-84 supra and accompanying text.
107 See notes 60-77 supra and accompanying text.
108 422 F. Supp. at 556 (emphasis in original). The court, however, bifurcated the issues,
recognizing a distinction between the supervisor's sexual misconduct and the employer's acts
following Tomkins' complaint of sexual abuse. Id. While unwilling to impute liability to the
employer for the acts of her supervisor, but see note 112 infra, the court denied PSE&G's
motion to dismiss on the issue of employer retaliation since such actions may constitute Title
VII sex discrimination. 422 F. Stpp. at 557. The court reasoned that in choosing to fire Tomkins rather than investigate her charge, the company may consciously be placing a higher value
on the services of the male employee to the detriment of the female employee, thereby discriminating on the basis of sex. Id.
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tally outside the realm of conceivability. 10 9 Therefore, though "an
unhappy and recurrent feature of our social experience," the supervisor's conduct was purely personal and not sex discrimination as defined by Title VII.'1 0 Policy considerations, expressed and implied
in previous legal determinations which rejected a cause of action br
sexual harassment, also emerged as the basis for the district court's
rationale.1 1 1 Recognizing "that the power inherent in a position of
authority is necessarily coercive," 1 12 the court expressly feared that
should Tomkins prevail, any sexual advance by a superior to a subor113
dinate would theoretically constitute a Title VII violation.
In its reversal and remand of the district court's opinion, the
Third Circuit decided the case by initially accepting as true the allegations as pleaded, followed by an evaluation of those allegations as
stated by the appellant. 1 14 Based on its interpretation of the applicable provision of Title VII 115 and utilizing the distinctions gleaned
Id. at 556. The court was not predisposed to a finding that Title VII was intended to
remedy what was seen as simply the tortious conduct of one person towards another "which
happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley." Id.
110 Id. (footnote omitted). That the supervisor was male and the subordinate female
was irrelevant under the theory posited by the lower court. Id. Conceivably, the genders of the
parties may "have been reversed, or even not crossed at all." Id. Therefore, gender per se was
"incidental" to the abusive conduct. Id.
"I' Id. at 556-57. See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. at 163 ("an outgrowth of holding such activity [sexual harassment] to be actionable under Title VII would be a
potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances
toward another"); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. at 236 ("It is conceivable, under
plaintiff's theory, that flirtations of the smallest order would give rise to liability."); Barnes v.
Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 124 (conduct alleged was "not the type of discriminatory
conduct contemplated by the 1972 Act") (emphasis added).
112 422 F. Supp. at 557. It should be noted that had the district court initially succeeded in
perceiving discrimination on the basis of sex, it would not have had as much difficulty as did
prior cases in imputing liability to the employer for purposes of finding a Title VII violation.
The court viewed the supervisor's acts as personal only because it did not view them as gender-based. The viability of the doctrine of respondeat superior was acknowledged when the acts
are performed within the scope of employment. Id. at 556 n.*. This position is considerably
broader than the Costle concurrence and the Munford opinion. See notes 94, 103-44 supra and
accompanying text. However, as the court reiterated, "if the underlying wrong does not constitute sex discrimination, sex discrimination cannot be imputed to the employer." 422 F. Supp. at
556 n.*.
113 Id. at 557. Thus, the court's reasoning appears to be an attempt to dam the "floodgates of
litigation" envisioned to ensue should sexual harassment be seen as remedied by Title VII. Id.
For further discussion, see notes 140-43 infra and accompanying text.
114 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045-49 (3d Cir. 1977). The
appellate court was much more disposed than was the lower court to adhere to the spirit and
letter of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as construed by the United States
Supreme Court. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
174-75 (1965) ("the allegations of the counterclaim ... as well as the resulting damage suffered
...are taken as true") (footnote omitted).
115 See note 28 supra.
109
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from prior decisions involving sexual harassment,"16 the court recognized two factors necessary for a cognizable claim of sex discrimination: first, the imposition of a term or condition of employment; and
second, such term or condition "imposed by the employer on the
basis of sex." 117 As to the first requirement, the "major thrust" of
Adrienne Tomkins' allegation was "that her employer, either knowingly or constructively, made acquiescence in her supervisor's sexual
demands a necessary prerequisite to the continuation of, or advancement in, her job." 1 1 8 Thus, the court viewed these specific
allegations as precluding a finding, as had the district court, that the
supervisor's conduct was a purely " 'personal' " endeavor without
employment repercussions. 1 19 Implicit both in the court's exposition
and in its specific holding is the premise that a Title VII cause of
action against an employer is established if the complaint alleges
employer know*ledge and acquiescence in the discriminatory conduct
20
of its agents.'
Because the court relied wholly on the pleadings in concluding
that an additional condition of employment had been imposed, it expressly reserved consideration of an alternative theory of employer
liability which had been presented by appellant Tomkins. 12 1 It was
proposed that Title VII provides a "right to a work environment free
from the psychological harm flowing from an atmosphere of discrimination." 122 In essence, this theory analogizes to cases which have
1I" According to the court, the key variation in prior cases which determined whether a
violation of Title VII had been advanced originated with the complaints themselves, i.e.,
whether the complaint "alleg[ed) sexual advances of an individual or personal nature . . . [or]
direct employment consequences flowing from the advances." 568 F.2d at 1048.
17 Id. at 1046, 1048. The court's intepretation is substantially similar to the analytical result.
reached by the Munford court as to the requirements for a Title V1I sex discrimination action.
While Munford evaluated the "employment practice" alleged for purposes of imputing liability
to the employer, Tomkins looked to whether a "term or condition of employment" had been
imposed. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
118 568 F.2d at 1046. Since the opinion was so procedurally oriented, it is interesting to note
the implication that the alleged facts raised inferences of an additional condition of employment.
Id. at 1047. One might conclude, therefore, that had Adrienne Tomkins' complaint not been as
procedurally sufficient, the court may have been disposed to find an additional condition of
employment based upon inferences gleaned from the facts rather than from express allegations.
'19 Id. at 1046. The court cited Griggs with approval alluding to the Supreme Court's declaration "that the purpose of ... Title VII was 'the removal of artificial, Arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment.
Id. at 1047 n.2 (quoting 401 U.S. at 431); see notes 44-45
supra and accompanying text.
120 568 F.2d at 1047, 1048-49. Of course, as the court notes, a plaintiff must prove the
allegations at trial in order to ultimately impose vicarious liability upon the employer for the
acts of its supervisory personnel. Id. at 1047 n.3, 1049; accord, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. at 660; see note 84 supra.
" ' 568 F.2d at 1046 n.1.
'2
Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 15.
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held that Title VII's proscription regarding " 'terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment' " is a comprehensive proposition protective
of "employees' psychological as well as economic fringes." 123 This
view is also in accord with EEOC decisions which "ha[ve] consistently ruled that Title VII obligates an employer to maintain a working atmosphere free of intimidation based upon race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.' " 124
The crux of the theory is that Title VII not only prohibits specific
discriminatory practices of economic impact, i.e., hiring, firing, and
promotional policies, but the prohibition also encompasses those subtler practices impacting emotionally and psychologically upon an
employee.12 5 Thus affected, an employee is burdened with "the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of

. .

. discrimination" be-

cause of his or her class status.' 2 6 Based on the premise that Title
VII mandated "a work environment free from psychological harm," it
was proposed that the supervisor's gender-based conduct gave rise to
an atmosphere of sexual intimidation and coercion, no less harmful in
effect than racial epithets or ethnic jokes, thereby engendering a bar2 7
rier to Tomkins' employment opportunities.1
123 Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
(opinion of Goldberg, J.) (employer held in violation of Title V1I in that he segregated his
patients based on national origin causing his employee of same minority national origin
psychological harm by such discriminatory segregation), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). See
also Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discriminatory hiring
practices by employer "support and atmosphere of discrimination which has caused . . .
psychological harm" to black employees and can reasonably be construed as violative of present
minority employees' Title VII employment interests).
124 EEOC Decision No. 72-1114, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 842, 843 (1972) (Title VII violated

when employer permits supervisor to proselytize his religious beliefs during work hours because
of intimidating effect on employees). E.g., EEOC Decision No. 72-0679, 4 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 441, 442 (1971) (Title VII's race and sex discrimination provisions violated when employer
refers to black female employees as " 'girls' " since such racial reference "is inherently more
offensive . .. because of the repellant historical images the term understandably evokes" and
from historical perspective it intrinsically embraces "an implication of female inferiority");
EEOC Decision No. 70-683, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 606, 607 (1970) (supervisors' disparaging
statements regarding employees' national origin violative of Title VII since indicative of disparate condition of employment).
125 Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d at 238.
126 Id. Although not pertinent to the theory as advanced, overlapping into the economic
sphere may occur. In some situations, the debilitating effects will ultimately have an adverse
impact upon the quantity and quality of an employee's output with resulting econorfiic ramifications.
12' Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 14-18. Perhaps an additional analogy can be made to
a relatively recent New Jersey case which concluded that an employee, allergic to her fellow
employees' cigarette smoke, "ha[d] a common law right to a safe working environment." Shimp
v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 525, 368 A.2d 408, 413 (Ch. Div. 1976). Her
employer, therefore, was placed under "a duty to abate the hazard which cause[d] the discomfort." Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416.
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To state a valid claim under Title VII pursuant to Tomkins, an
allegation that a gender-based term or condition of employment has
been imposed will assure a trial on the merits. 128 Absent this express allegation, the facts alone may be sufficient to raise an inference
of a sex-based additional condition of employment, thus avoiding dismissal of the action. 129 Once in court, however, the plaintiff bears
the initial burden of persuasion in order to establish a prima facie
case of sex discrimination. 130 Problems may arise in instances where
an employer, while denying the charge of sexual harassment, produces an employment record revealing excessive absenteeism or
other indicia of poor performance as justification for whatever adverse
131
employment consequences ensued.
The Tomkins court's express deferment of the "psychological
harm" theory restricts the plaintiff's claims, especially against substantial rebuttal evidence. Yet, one can conceptualize sexual coercion
and intimidation as bearing heavily on an employee's ability to work
at optimum capacity. Expansion of the "terms, conditions, or
privileges" requirement to encompass the "psychological harm"
theory in sexual harassment claims would more realistically promote
the declared purposes and policies of the Act by allowing "the trier of
fact . . . [to] make the necessary determination based upon 'reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of facts, the conglomerate of
activities, and the entire web of circumstances presented by the evidence on the record as a whole.' "132
It would seem that "a safe working environment" could be construed as including not only
physical but psychological effects as well. Thus, an employer may well have a duty to restrict
the uninvited and offensive sexual advances of its employees. Under Title VII analysis, "a safe
working environment" might be considered "a privilege of employment" protected from discriminatory encroachment based on impermissible classifications.
128 568 F.2d at 1046, 1048; see note 117 supra and accompanying text.
129 See note 118 supra.
130 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). While McDonnell established the burden procedure in a racial discrimination context, "the same rules would apply to
sex discrimination." Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522. 533 n.4 (W.D. Pa.
1973); accord, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 329 (1977).
Once a prima facie case has been shown, the burden "shift[s] to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions. 411 U.S. at 802. In the event the
employer meets its rebuttal burden, the plaintiff still has the "opportunity to demonstrate by
competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons . . . were in fact a coverup for a ...
discriminatory decision." Id. at 805.
131 For example, PSE&G alleged that Tomkins was terminated solely because of her "poor
attendance record." Brief of Appellee, supra note 13, at 3; see note 13 supra and accompanying
text.
132 Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Aeronca Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 385 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1967)).
Generally, Title VII's "terms and conditions" clause is analyzed by the courts only in cases
where the discrimination is subtle. In blatant cases, it is obviously implied.
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Once the Tomkins court determined that an additional condition
of employment had been imposed, it next considered whether it was
imposed because of gender.1 33 The court again went no further than
the facial allegations, noting the "essence" of Tomkins' sex discrimination claim to be "that her status as a female was the motivating factor
in the supervisor's conditioning her continued employment on compliance with his sexual demands." 134 By reasoning procedurally,
the court deemed "irrelevant" the substantive hypothetical posited by
PSE&G that a party demanding sexual relations "could . . . [be]
either male or female with homosexual, heterosexual or bisexual tendencies" hence, the class discriminated against would not be gender-based but would only include those subjected to and declining
such demands-presumably, both males and females.' 3 5 The court
noted, however, that the district court, in accepting this rationale for
purposes of its analysis, had "t[aken] much too narrow a view of what
can constitute sex-based discrimination under Title VII."136 The
probability of such a case occurring, it was also noted, "would cause
no great concern" since in the sex discrimination sphere, Title VII
1 37
protects both men and women.
While this implies that men may also bring a sex discrimination
action if sexually harassed,1 3 8 it does not expressly deal with the conceptual problems raised by previous cases analyzing sexual harassment- specifically, the "bisexual supervisor" theory.1 39 This proposition, enunciated in Williams and confirmed in Costle, is that sexual
harassment initiated by a bisexual supervisor is not sex discrimination
133 568 F.2d at 1047.
134

Id. (footnote omitted).

135 Brief of Appellee, supra note 13, at 8; 568 F.2d at 1047 n.4. PSE&G argued that Tomkins

was discriminated against not because she was a woman but because she refused to submit to
her supervisor's demands. Id. Moreover, because her gender was incidental, her supervisor's
conduct, though sexual in nature, involved merely an employee interpersonal relationship and
was not discrimination as envisioned under Title VII. Id. To summarize, sex was not a factor.
This argument is based on the "personal relationship" finding of Barnes v. Train, see text at
notes 64-65 supra, which in turn provided the foundation of the defendant's argument in Williams. See note 79 supra. Additionally, PSE&G incorporated the tenuous analysis of "supervisor
preference" originating in Williams. See notes 83 supra and 141 infra.
136 568 F.2d at 1047 n.4. The court essentially adopted the EEOC interpretation of sex
discrimination stating that an allegation is sufficient where "gender is a substantial factor in the
discrimination" and where the alleged conduct would not have occurred had the employee been
of the opposite sex. Id. In so reiterating, the court implicitly rejected the "sex-plus" theory. See
note 40 supra.
137 568 F.2d at 1047 n.4.
138 Accord, Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55; Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 659
n.6.
'3 Note that while not of significant impact in reality, it is important to point out the difficulties with present sexual harassment rationale.
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since such conduct is de facto regardless of sex. 140 This conclusion
raises an inference that these courts may not be basing their analysis
of sex discrimination solely on the gender of the harassed employee,
but may subconsciously be considering the sexual preference of the
supervisor as partially determinative of the issue. 1 4 1 Perhaps, the
obvious omission of the bisexuality concept from both the district and
appellate courts' analysis, though considering the hypothesis in terms
of heterosexuality and homosexuality, impliedly reflects the tenuousness of such a theory. 142 In any event, the perceptions embodied
within the "psychological harm" theory would again seem to alleviate
See 413 F. Supp. at 659 n.6; 561 F.2d at 990 n.55.
The court in Williams expressly rejected this contention but noted in any event that the
reason for the discrimination is irrelevant to the finding of discrimination. 413 F. Supp. at 659
n.6. It subsequently stated, however, that a finding of discrimination could not be made where
the supervisor was bisexual. Id.
Note also that the "but for" test of Costle does not survive the "bisexual supervisor" theory
because, as the court reasons, the condition imposed would apply to both males and females.
561 F.2d at 990 n.55. The distinction, however, is illusory for if in each individual case of sexual
harassment, regardless of supervisor preference, an additional condition is imposed which would
not have existed if the particular employee's sex was not a pertinent factor, the gender class of
any other employee not approached is irrelevant. In other words, it is not a question of to who
the additional condition would apply but to whom in fact it did apply. This would be true in
instances where the supervisor is either heterosexual or homosexual and should similarly apply
where the supervisor is bisexual. It might even be palpably argued that Title VII, in prohibiting
discrimination based on sex: establishes sex as the class, interpretable not only in terms of
male/female distinctions, but also in terms of gender/non-gender distinctions.
It is possible that the problem has arisen because the courts are not sufficiently distinguishing
between two connotations of the term "sex," that is, sex as "one of the two divisions of...
human beings respectively designated male or female," i.e., gender, and sex as "the phenomena
of sexual instincts and their manifestations." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 1081 (1971). If harassment is not sexual in nature but its effect, through intimidation and
coercion, is to impose a term or condition of employment because of the employee's sex, it is
prohibited by Title VII as sex discrimination. See, e.g., Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F. Supp. 1231,
1235 (D.D.C. 1976) (since courts would not involve themselves in remedying employment inequities and personnel judgments, crucial question for Title VII to be operative was whether
employer's actions "reflected an antipathy to women rather than an antipathy solely to this
woman's personality").
Similarly, sexual harassment is prohibited by Title VII, not because its underlying purpose is
sexual, but because of the imposition of a term or condition of employment on the basis of the
employee's gender. Alternatively, if an employee is harassed, intimidated or coerced because of
a personality conflict or some other manifestation unrelated to race, color, religion, sex or national origin, there would be no violation of Title VII even though a term or condition of
employment had been imposed. Alternative relief may be available to an employee so harassed,
but Title VII would not be an option. See, e.g., Associated Util. Serv. v. Board of Review, 131
N.J. Super. 584, 589, 331 A.2d 39, 41 (App. Div. 1974) ("intentional harassment" causing "intolerable and abnormal working conditions" would justify leaving job and under circumstances,
such employee would qualify for unemployment benefits). Assuming, however, that sexual
harassment by its very nature requires the victim to be of a particular gender, then it is discrimination on account of sex and the initiator's sexual preference is of no bearing.
142 See 568 F.2d at 1047 n.4; 422 F. Supp. at 556.
'4
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the conceptual difficulties burdening present sexual harassment
analysis.
After ultimately determining that Title VII sex discrimination encompasses sexual harassment, the Tomkins court felt compelled to
comment disapprovingly on the district court's cynicism concerning
potential complaintants should such a cause of action be made available. 143 Predicating its commentary on the policy underlying the
very existence of the federal courts and expressing its faith in the
judicial system to competently further such policy, the Tomkins court
manifestly indicated that the decision to consider Title VII as viable
in a sexual harassment suit "in no way relieves the plaintiff of the
burden of proving the facts alleged to establish the required elements
of a Title VII violation." 144 Considering the particularity with which
the Third Circuit enunciated the requirements necessary to formulate
a sexual harassment claim, 145 in addition to the burden of proving the
particular facts at trial, it appears unlikely that an employer need
fear, as did the district court, the potentiality of "[a]n invitation to
146
dinner . . . becom[ing] an invitation to a federal lawsuit."
The significance of Tomkins lies in the simplicity of its logic. A
federal statute existed which proscribed employment discrimination
on the basis of certain impermissible classifications. A reasonable interpretation of such statute required that sexual harassment be recognized as prohibited gender-based discrimination, when an overt term
or condition of employment was imposed. 14 7 Adherence to a firm
federal policy, mandating that aggrieved citizens be provided a forum
143 568 F.2d at 1049. Conventional prejudicial attitudes rather than sound legal reasoning
seem to have formed the basis for the lower court's attempted prophecy:
[I]f an inebriated approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christmas
party could form the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a promotion
or a raise is later denied to the subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal trial
judges instead of some 400.
422 F. Supp. at 557.
144 568 F.2d at 1049.
115 Id. at 1048-49; see note 25 supra.
146 422 F. Supp. at 557.
'47 Under Tomkins, the employment harm must be obvious. The question of whether the
imposition of a psychological barrier, as opposed to an economic barrier, is prohibited remains
left open for future determination, see notes 121-27 supra and accompanying text. It seems
plain that co-worker sexual advances are not violative of Title VII. It is unclear, however,
whether the employment harm must be actual or potential, that is, must the employee show
apparent economic injury or, by virtue of the supervisor's authoritative position, will verbalization of imminent injury be sufficient. Adrienne Tomkins was ultimately fired, but the court's
opinion speaks in terms of conditioning job status, perhaps implying that the threat of economic
retaliation itself would require employer intervention. In any event, Tomkins stands as a message for employers to. "nip such conduct in the bud."
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in which claimed infringements upon their federal rights may be asserted and litigated, necessitated that a cause of action be promulgated. And finally, delineation of the precise conduct and circumstances necessary to assert this claimed right 148 both ensured
149
fairness to litigants and preserved the credibility of the courts.
150
"The mills of the law grind slowly-but not inexorably."
Marie Nardino

148 See note 25 supra. The issue of employer liability under the Act appears foreclosed to the
extent that the sexual harassment occurs within the confines of a supervisor/subordinate relationship and the employer, with knowledge, takes no affirmative steps to remedy the situation. Thus, as a legal concept, "sexual harassment in employment" may be considered twopronged, consisting of both the intimidating words or acts and the coercive power to "reek
economic havoc" should the words or acts remain unheeded.
149 See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra.
150 United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 109 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).

